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**OFFICE OF PETITIONS**

MIKHAIL LEVITIN  
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REEDERS PA 18352-0102

In re Application of  
MIKHAIL LEVITIN And Boris Khaytin  
Application No. 09/808,962  
Filed: March 16, 2001  
Title: METHOD OF RUNNING A  
CONDENSER FOR LIQUIDATION OF  
STEAM OR VAPOR

DECISION ON PETITION

This is a decision on the petition filed July 18, 2004, under 37 C.F.R. §1.137(a)<sup>1</sup>, to revive the above-identified application.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to reply in a timely manner to the non-final Office action, mailed May 23, 2002, which set a shortened statutory period for reply of three (3) months. No response was received, and no extensions of time under the provisions of 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a) were requested. Accordingly, the above-identified application became abandoned on June 24, 2002. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed on February 7, 2003.

A response to the non-final Office action was submitted on February 12, 2003. On February 24, 2003 a petition was filed to have the holding of abandonment withdrawn. This petition was dismissed via the mailing of a decision on May 19, 2004. With the present petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.137(a), Petitioner has submitted a statement of facts, the petition fee, and a copy of a phone bill.

Petitioner has met requirements (1) and (2) above. The fourth requirement is not applicable.

<sup>1</sup> A grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by:

- (1) The reply required to the outstanding Office action or notice, unless previously filed;
- (2) The petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(l);
- (3) A showing to the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition was unavoidable;
- (4) Any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.

As to item (3), the showing of record is not sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the delay was unavoidable within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(a).

**The Commissioner is responsible for determining the standard for unavoidable delay and for applying that standard.**

"In the specialized field of patent law, . . . the Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application and enforcement of the various narrow and technical statutory and regulatory provisions.<sup>2</sup> The Commissioner's interpretation of those provisions is entitled to considerable deference."

"[T]he Commissioner's discretion cannot remain wholly uncontrolled, if the facts **clearly** demonstrate that the applicant's delay in prosecuting the application was unavoidable, and that the Commissioner's adverse determination lacked **any** basis in reason or common sense."<sup>3</sup>

"The court's review of a Commissioner's decision is 'limited, however, to a determination of whether the agency finding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.'<sup>4</sup>

"The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."<sup>5</sup>

**The standard**

"[T]he question of whether an applicant's delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable must be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the facts and circumstances into account."<sup>6</sup> The general question asked by the Office is: "Did petitioner act as a reasonable and prudent person in relation to his most important business?"

Nonawareness of a PTO rule will not constitute unavoidable delay.<sup>8</sup> The burden of showing the cause of the delay is on the person seeking to revive the application.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900, 904, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd without opinion (Rule 36), 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir.1991) (citing Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg 849 F.2d 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference"); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) ("if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")

<sup>3</sup> Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique et al. v. Watson, 274 F.2d 594, 597, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).

<sup>4</sup> Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S. Ct.1241, 1244 (1973) (citing 5 U.S.C. 706 (2)(A)); Beerly v. Dept. of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Mossinghoff, 217 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 671 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir.1982)).

<sup>5</sup> Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608, 34 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 77 L.Ed.2d 443, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983)).

<sup>6</sup> Id.

<sup>7</sup> See In re Mattulah, 38 App. D.C. 497 (D.C. Cir. 1912).

A delay caused by an applicant's lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice, or the MPEP is not rendered "unavoidable" due to either the applicant's reliance upon oral advice from USPTO employees or the USPTO's failure to advise the applicant to take corrective action<sup>10</sup>.

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present<sup>11</sup>.

A petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable"<sup>12</sup>.

### **The portions of the CFR and the MPEP relevant to the abandonment of this application**

37 C.F.R. § 1.8 sets forth, in part:

§ 1.8 Certificate of mailing or transmission.

(a) Except in the cases enumerated in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, correspondence required to be filed in the Patent and Trademark Office within a set period of time will be considered as being timely filed if the procedure described in this section is followed. The actual date of receipt will be used for all other purposes.

(1) Correspondence will be considered as being timely filed if:

(i) The correspondence is mailed or transmitted prior to expiration of the set period of time by being:

(A) Addressed as set out in § 1.1(a) and deposited with the U.S. Postal Service with sufficient postage as first class mail; or

(B) Transmitted by facsimile to the Patent and Trademark Office in accordance with § 1.6(d); and

(ii) The correspondence includes a certificate for each piece of correspondence stating the date of deposit or transmission. The person signing the certificate should have reasonable basis to expect that the correspondence would be mailed or transmitted on or before the date indicated.

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<sup>8</sup> See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel's nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute "unavoidable" delay)). Although court decisions have only addressed the issue of lack of knowledge of an attorney, there is no reason to expect a different result due to lack of knowledge on the part of a pro se (one who prosecutes on his own) applicant. It would be inequitable for a court to determine that a client who spends his hard earned money on an attorney who happens not to know a specific rule should be held to a higher standard than a pro se applicant who makes (or is forced to make) the decision to file the application without the assistance of counsel.

<sup>9</sup> Id.

<sup>10</sup> See In re Sivertz, 227 USPQ 255, 256 (Comm'r Pat. 1985).

<sup>11</sup> In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. at (1912)(quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913).

<sup>12</sup> Haines, 673 F. Supp. at 314, 316-17; 5 USPQ2d at 1131-32.

- (2) The procedure described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply to, and no benefit will be given to a Certificate of Mailing or Transmission on, the following:
- (i) Relative to Patents and Patent Applications —
  - (A) The filing of a national patent application specification and drawing or other correspondence for the purpose of obtaining an application filing date, including a request for a continued prosecution application under § 1.53(d);
  - (B) The filing of correspondence in an interference which an examiner-in-chief orders to be filed by hand or "Express Mail";
  - (C) The filing of agreements between parties to an interference under 35 U.S.C. 135(c);
  - (D) The filing of an international application for patent;
  - (E) The filing of correspondence in an international application before the U.S. Receiving Office, the U.S. International Searching Authority, or the U.S. International Preliminary Examining Authority;
  - (F) The filing of a copy of the international application and the basic national fee necessary to enter the national stage, as specified in § 1.495(b).

- ...
- (b) In the event that correspondence is considered timely filed by being mailed or transmitted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, but not received in the Patent and Trademark Office, and the application is held to be abandoned or the proceeding is dismissed, terminated, or decided with prejudice, the correspondence will be considered timely if the party who forwarded such correspondence:
- (1) Informs the Office of the previous mailing or transmission of the correspondence promptly after becoming aware that the Office has no evidence of receipt of the correspondence;
  - (2) Supplies an additional copy of the previously mailed or transmitted correspondence and certificate; and
  - (3) Includes a statement which attests on a personal knowledge basis or to the satisfaction of the Director to the previous timely mailing or transmission. If the correspondence was sent by facsimile transmission, a copy of the sending unit's report confirming transmission may be used to support this statement.
- (c) The Office may require additional evidence to determine if the correspondence was timely filed.

[41 FR 43721, Oct. 4, 1976; 43 FR 20461, May 11, 1978; para. (a). 47 FR 47381, Oct. 26, 1982, effective Oct. 26, 1982; para. (a). 48 FR 2708, Jan. 20, 1983; para. (a) 49 FR 48416, Dec. 12, 1984, effective Feb. 11, 1985; para. (a). 49 FR 5171, Feb. 6, 1985, effective Mar. 8, 1985; 52 FR 20046, May 28, 1987; subparas. (a)(2)(xiv)-(xvi), 54 FR 37588, Sept. 11, 1989, effective Nov. 16, 1989; revised, 58 FR 54494, Oct. 22, 1993, effective Nov. 22, 1993; para. (a) revised, 61 FR 56439, Nov. 1, 1996, effective Dec. 2, 1996; paras. (a)(2)(i)(A) & (b) revised; 62 FR 53131, Oct. 10, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997; para. (a)(2)(i)(F) revised, 67 FR 520, Jan. 4, 2002, effective Apr. 1, 2002; para. (b)(3) revised, 68 FR 14332, Mar. 25, 2003, effective May 1, 2003; para. (a)(2)(ii) removed and reserved, 68 FR 48286, Aug. 13, 2003, effective Sept. 12, 2003]

37 C.F.R. § 1.134: Time period for reply to an Office action.

An Office action will notify the applicant of any non-statutory or shortened statutory time period set for reply to an Office action. Unless the applicant is notified in writing that a reply is required in less than six months, a maximum period of six months is allowed.

[47 FR 41276, Sept. 17, 1982, effective Oct. 1, 1982; revised, 62 FR 53131, Oct. 10, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997]

37 C.F.R. § 1.135 Abandonment for failure to reply within time period.

- (a) If an applicant of a patent application fails to reply within the time period provided under § 1.134 and § 1.136, the application will become abandoned unless an Office action indicates otherwise.
- (b) Prosecution of an application to save it from abandonment pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section must include such complete and proper reply as the condition of the application may require. The admission of, or refusal to

admit, any amendment after final rejection or any amendment not responsive to the last action, or any related proceedings, will not operate to save the application from abandonment.

- (c) When reply by the applicant is a bona fide attempt to advance the application to final action, and is substantially a complete reply to the non-final Office action, but consideration of some matter or compliance with some requirement has been inadvertently omitted, applicant may be given a new time period for reply under § 1.134 to supply the omission.

[Paras. (a), (b), and (c), 47 FR 41276, Sept. 17, 1982, effective Oct. 1, 1982; para. (d) deleted, 49 FR 555, Jan. 4, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1984; revised, 62 FR 53131, Oct. 10, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997]

Section 512 of the MPEP sets forth, in part:

Under 37 CFR 1.8, a person may state on certain papers directed to the Office (exceptions are stated in 37 CFR 1.8), the date on which the paper will be deposited in the United States Postal Service or transmitted by facsimile. If the date stated is within the period for reply, the reply in most instances will be considered to be timely. This is true even if the paper does not actually reach the Office until after the end of the period for reply. The Certificate of Mailing procedure does not apply to papers mailed in a foreign country.

The Certificate of Transmission procedure, however, also applies to papers transmitted to the Office from a foreign country provided that the correspondence being transmitted is not prohibited from being transmitted by facsimile and is not otherwise precluded from receiving the benefits under 37 CFR 1.8.

It should be noted, however, that the Office will continue its normal practice of stamping the date of receipt ("Office Date" Stamp) on all papers received through the mail or by facsimile except those filed under 37 CFR 1.10 (See MPEP § 513). The date stamped will also be the date which is entered on Office records and from which any subsequent periods are calculated. For example, 37 CFR 1.192 gives an appellant 2 months from the date of the appeal to file an appeal brief. For example, if the last day to reply to a final rejection was November 10, 1997, and applicant deposited a Notice of Appeal with fee in the U.S. mail on November 10, 1997, and so certified, that appeal is timely even if it was not received in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office until November 16, 1997. Since the date of receipt will be used to calculate the time at which the brief is due, the brief was due on January 16, 1998. This is 2 months after the Mail Center date.

37 CFR 1.8(a)(2)(i)(A) specifically refers to a request for a continued prosecution application (CPA) filed under 37 CFR 1.53(d) as a correspondence filed for the purposes of obtaining an application filing date and the procedures and benefit set forth in 37 CFR 1.8(a)(1) are not applicable to a request for a CPA. The date on a certificate of mailing or transmission (37 CFR 1.8(a)) of a CPA is not controlling or even relevant. A CPA filed by facsimile transmission will not be accorded a filing date as of the date on the certificate of transmission unless Office records indicate, or applicant otherwise establishes pursuant to 37 CFR 1.6(f), receipt in the Office of the complete CPA on the date on the certificate of transmission and that date is not a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday within the District of Columbia.

[41 FR 43721, Oct. 4, 1976; 43 FR 20461, May 11, 1978; para. (a), 47 FR 47381, Oct. 26, 1982, effective Oct. 26, 1982; para. (a), 48 FR 2708, Jan. 20, 1983; para. (a), 49 FR 48416, Dec. 12, 1984, effective Feb. 11, 1985; para. (a), 49 FR 5171, Feb. 6, 1985, effective Mar. 8, 1985; 52 FR 20046, May 28, 1987; subparas. (a)(2)(xiv)-(xvi), 54 FR 37588, Sept. 11, 1989, effective Nov. 16, 1989; revised, 58 FR 54494, Oct. 22, 1993, effective Nov. 22, 1993; para. (a) revised, 61 FR 56439, Nov. 1, 1996, effective Dec. 2, 1996; paras. (a)(2)(i)(A) & (b) revised; 62 FR 53131, Oct. 10, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997; para. (a)(2)(i)(F) revised, 67 FR 520, Jan. 4, 2002, effective Apr. 1, 2002]

**Application of the standard to the current facts and circumstances**

On May 23, 2002, Applicant was mailed a non-final Office Action, which gave a two-month period for response. With the present Petition, Petitioner sets forth that a response to this non-

final Office Action was submitted to the Office on June 17, 2002 and again on June 25, 2002. Petitioner alleges that on an unspecified date, he spoke with the Examiner over the phone and the Examiner confirmed having received the amendment. Petitioner adds "these correspondences were done according to #37CFR 1.8."

This argument is not persuasive.

The Patent Office file is the official record of the papers filed in this application. The official file has been reviewed, and the responses which was purportedly submitted on June 17, 2002 and again on June 25, 2002 have not been located.

It is noted that Petitioner has submitted neither a postcard receipt to evince receipt of the drawings, nor a certificate of mailing pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.8 to establish that they were sent.

The PTO has a well established and well publicized practice by which practitioners may provide proof that papers were submitted to the Office on a particular date. Any papers which are required to be filed in the PTO within a set period of time will be considered as being timely filed if a certificate of facsimile transmission is properly prepared and executed. See 37 C.F.R. §1.8.

The response which was submitted with the previous petition to withdraw the holding of abandonment has been reviewed, and it is noted that the response contains the assertion:

The attached papers are the same copies of the correspondence that have been sent to the PTO by facsimile...on June 17, 2002...and June 25, 2002...with regards to case # 09/808,962

(Page 1)

It is noted that the response provided with the previous petition does not contain a certificate of mailing. Therefore, since the response is a duplicate of that which was purportedly submitted on June 17, 2002 and again on June 25, 2002, each of those submissions failed to contain a certificate of mailing. Since neither communication contains a certificate of mailing, Petitioner cannot rely on certificate of mailing practice to establish that these communications were timely submitted, and the submission of phone records cannot serve as the functional equivalent of a certificate of mailing.

### Conclusion

It follows that the renewed petition must be **DISMISSED**.

Any request for a renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.137(a) must be submitted within **TWO (2) MONTHS** from the mail date of this decision. Extension of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The response should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition Under 37 CFR 1.137(a) (or §1.137(b), if applicable)". This is not a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C 704.

Since the submission does not contain a certificate of mailing, it appears that Petitioner cannot furnish the evidence which would be required in order to establish that the delay was

unavoidable. If this is in fact the case, Petitioner may also wish to consider filing a petition to revive based on unintentional abandonment under 37 CFR 1.137(b)<sup>13</sup>.

The renewed petition should display "Please deliver to Paul Shanoski, c/o Office of Petitions" in a prominent manner. Any renewed petition may be submitted by mail<sup>14</sup>, hand-delivery<sup>15</sup>, or facsimile<sup>16</sup>.

Telephone inquiries regarding *this decision* should be directed to the undersigned at (571) 272-3225. All other inquiries concerning examination procedures or status of the application should be directed to the Technology Center.

**The application file will be retained in the Office of Petitions for a period of TWO MONTHS.**



**Paul Shanoski**  
**Senior Attorney**  
**Office of Petitions**  
**United States Patent and Trademark Office**

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13 A grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by:

- (1) The reply required to the outstanding Office action or notice, unless previously filed;
- (2) The petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(m);
- (3) A statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unintentional. The Commissioner may require additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional, and;
- (4) Any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.

14 Mail Stop Petition, Commissioner for Patents, United States Patent and Trademark Office, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA, 22313-1450.

15 Customer Window, Randolph Building, 401 Dulaney Street, Alexandria, VA, 22314.

16 (703) 872-9306 - please note this is a central facsimile number. On July 15, 2005, the Central FAX Number will change to 571-273-8300. To give customers time to adjust to the new Central FAX Number, faxes sent to the old number (703-872-9306) will be routed to the new number until September 15, 2005.